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Agenda item

Surveillance and implementation of RIPA within the PPP

The Joint Management Board requested an update on the subject following external audits of the partner authorities by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office (IPCO).

To follow up on feedback from senior officers across each of the 3 partners that this process (external audit) could be improved if there was a greater collective understanding of how officers in the PPP may use the methods and powers incorporated under the relevant legislation and associated policy.

To circulate information about body worn cameras and CCTV for enforcement purposes.

To highlight the work of the National Anti-Fraud Network and how it links to the PPP.

Minutes:

The Committee considered the report (Agenda Item 7) which provided an update on the subject following external audits of the partner authorities by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office (IPCO).

The report was in follow up to feedback from senior officers across each of the three partners that the external audit process could be improved if there was a greater collective understanding of how officers in the PPP might use the methods and powers incorporated under the relevant legislation and associated policy.

The report also provided information about body worn cameras and CCTV for enforcement purposes. The work of the National Anti-Fraud Network and how it linked with the PPP was also highlighted within the report.

Paul Anstey, Head of Public Protection and Culture, presented the report. He explained that as part of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA), each of the three partner authorities were audited externally by the IPCO. The audit considered the policies in place and how they were implemented. The IPCO sought to ensure that local authorities were acting and using RIPA powers appropriately, for example in the use of cameras in operations, either body worn or CCTV. This was an area with strict codes of practice to be followed.

The PPP engaged with the National Anti-Fraud Network. This provided a level of expertise and oversight across relevant areas of activity.

The three audits held were largely complimentary. It was noted that the PPP helped its local authorities to upskill relevant officers. An example of this was the work done in relation to online trading via social networks. This helped to ensure that officers were conducting investigations on a proportionate basis. There were internal checks and balances to ensure that data collected from operations was treated securely and sensitively, i.e. data gained from telephone records. A clear audit trail was produced.

The PPP in its day to day work had to ensure that it was covering all of the bases and that added to the reason for retaining inhouse expertise around case management. The report also indicated who the key people were who need to be aware of clear audit trail.

Mr Anstey concluded by stating that the PPP conducted its work professionally. The PPP had established a good reputation and had an excellent track record in using the RIPA powers. The PPP’s prosecutions had a 100% success rate when using RIPA powers.

Councillor Chris Bowring referred to the IPCO findings given in the report and queried if there was awareness of the PPP as the findings related to individual local authorities. Mr Anstey gave an assurance that there was awareness. He explained that the audits took place for each individual Council as a whole and was not solely concerned with PPP activity. The PPP assisted with the wider work of local authorities, i.e. on surveillance activity.

Sean Murphy, Public Protection Manager, stated that while responsibilities fell to the individual councils, there was a common thread across the three authorities. He had been involved in the latest round of audits where the role of the PPP and the individual councils was made clear. However, any breach of RIPA would be by an individual local authority.

Councillor James Cole asked about the use of CHIS (Covert Human Intelligence Source) and issues that could emerge should there be a situation where unauthorised surveillance took place via permitted surveillance. Mr Anstey said that the CHIS approval process was vigorous and approval would come from a senior officer. The objectives of the operation would need to be absolutely clear. If it transpired that information was obtained beyond the objective then a decision would need to be taken at that point to either shut down the operation or to declared information for approval through the appropriate channels. Where this process was required, it would form part of the audit trail and used to inform future investigations. Mr Murphy added that this was a clear and tightly managed process for a complex area of activity.

RESOLVED that the report be noted.

Supporting documents: