Report of the Scrutiny Task and Finish Group on Project Management

(February 2026)

Executive Summary

This report presents the findings of the Task and Finish Group that was set up by the Resources and Place Scrutiny Committee to review the Council's approach to managing major projects and identify lessons to be learned from recent projects.

The review started by looking at how projects are managed in general terms, before progressing to look at two recent examples of major projects. The projects considered were:

- **Care Director version 6** - software used to manage adult and children's social care caseloads and related finance functions; and
- **iTrent Phase 1** - software used to deliver the Council's HR and payroll functions.

The Task and Finish Group was originally due to review a third project, but project management of the Sports Hub was recently reviewed by a separate task and finish group, so this was considered unnecessary.

The Task and Finish Group has developed a set of recommendations based on the evidence presented. Subject to the approval of the Resources and Place Scrutiny Committee, these recommendations will be referred to the Executive for consideration.

On the positive side there appears to be an increase in maturity in the approach and adoption of Project Management practices. There is now a well understood methodology consistent with government and industry good practice that covers the entire life cycle of projects from starting a project, through to directing a project and final project closure. In addition, the centralisation of the project management function is bearing fruit and hopefully will retain project management talent within the Council.

Setting of project tolerances of resource, time and cost, regularly reporting on these tolerances both in actual breach or risk of breach, does need to be managed more consistently, though there is strong evidence this is now carried out.

Senior Management and Leadership Teams must also be more challenging in formal reviews early on within a project cycle on defining the boundaries of tolerances. Again, it was good to see that one of the projects reviewed was "rescued" and delivered in a very tight timeline, however this approach should be a last resort as it can be very disruptive to the smooth running of the affected department. Project Boards and senior escalation routes to more senior boards are clearly an important control of bringing at risk projects back in tolerance for delivery.

It should also be noted, members of the Task and Finish Group were disturbed to find that some of the issues uncovered by this review echo those highlighted by the previous review of the London Road Industrial Estate project. It is hoped that officers will take the opportunity to embed these learnings in their working practices, so the same mistakes are not repeated in future projects.

In general, the Task Group was encouraged by the improvements to project management practices that are being rolled out through the Project Service. It is clear that there are pockets of excellence, with project managers and project sponsors who are delivering in accordance with agreed project management methodologies.

Procurement and Contracts and Supplier Relationship Management

Ref.	Recommendation
1.	For all major projects, suppliers must be asked to confirm what project management methodology they will be using.
2.	The Council must look 24 months ahead to identify where software support agreements for business critical systems are due to expire and procure replacements in good time to avoid unnecessary risk.
3.	Before commissioning major IT projects, there should be a full evaluation of all potential procurement options. This should be informed by the views of technical staff and other stakeholders who work with existing systems and suppliers. Any concerns raised should be captured in the risk log, which should be passed to the project team once procurement is complete.
4.	The Council should develop and maintain a live list of all IT systems and how they are integrated. This must be consulted when procuring all new IT systems to ensure the necessary system compatibility and functionality is specified and could be delivered by the new supplier. Any procurement of new IT systems should be signed off by the Council's ICT Service and the Project Sponsor.
5.	Wherever possible, the Council should seek to adopt standard business processes/working practices to avoid the need for IT product customisation, since bespoke changes can lead to unnecessary delays, project costs and risks.
6	Contracts for new IT systems must require suppliers to provide complete systems (including all necessary middleware and technical integration software) and associated product support for the life of the contract.
7.	Procurement timescales should factor in the potential for slippages, or failure to secure a new contract or, in extremis, the need to restart the procurement process.
8.	As part of due diligence, financial checks must be carried out on all contracts for business critical goods and services in order to be assured of the providers' financial viability. This needs to be done as part of the tender process, and at least annually thereafter as part of routine contract management. This should be done by an officer from Finance, Audit, or Procurement & Commissioning.
9.	Contract payments should be aligned clearly with project gateway review success. Large pre-payments before projects commencement should be avoided. Final payments should be set at an appropriate level to cover snagging issues and incentivise providers to complete in a timely manner.
10.	Contracts for critical services should include exit clauses to facilitate the handover of work and the onboarding of the new supplier at the end of the contract. The professional service rates should be clearly stated in the contract for exit services to be provided by the supplier. In many cases, the project/contract manager will be agreeing the detailed exit plan within a

	certain time period of contract signature, so it may be useful to develop guidance on this.
11.	In addition to all project managers, all Managers at Service Lead and above should have contract management training as part of their induction, with refresher training every three years thereafter. Service Leads should ensure there is a documented service review of all major contracts under their purview at intervals according to Recommendation 8 above.

Project Resources

12.	Cost benefit analysis should be undertaken over the lifetime of projects to inform decisions about delivery mechanisms. Similarly, there should be detailed up-front planning, mapping and costing of resources to inform the decision about whether to deliver projects using internal or external resources. A clear risk statement must be presented to the Project Board and Senior Leadership Team of resource commitment before approval of project commencement.
13.	Data ownership risk must be fully recorded in project and handed over to business on go-live. Full mitigation of the data loss risk must be adhered to at all times.
14.	All major projects must make use of **RACI** matrices to: • Identify who is **R**esponsible for delivery of each task. • Clarify who is **A**ccountable for decisions or delegations related to that task. • Specify who must be **C**onsulted before decisions are made about the task. • Identify who needs to be kept **I**nformed of progress.
15.	Staff, who need to manage major projects or be significantly engaged on these projects should not be asked to do this on top of business-as-usual activity. Instead, staff should have their substantive roles backfilled to allow them to focus on any major projects they are managing, or external project management support should be bought in. If this is not possible, then consideration should be given to what activities can be paused/scaled back for the duration of the project.
16.	Single points of failure should be avoided where an individual member of staff is the sole subject matter expert within the organisation.
17.	All projects must be properly scoped at the outset, with all West Berkshire Council actions and dependencies fully detailed. The scope must be signed off by all services that are key to delivery of a project, and resources must be allocated to tasks prior to project plans being signed off.
18.	Under the detailed project planning process, project dependencies must be identified, mapped, monitored and reported to the Project Board to highlight the implications of amending project timescales. Delays in the delivery of major projects must be taken into account when planning future staff workloads.

Project Deliverables

19.	For each project, there must be a clearly stated set of requirements that must be achieved in order for the project to be considered successful.

	Consideration should be given to use of the MoSCoW technique when defining these requirements. .
20	Large projects should be completed in phases, with business-critical aspects delivered first.

Risk Management

21.	All major projects must have risk registers that are kept updated and reported to the relevant project board on a regular basis. This must not be delegated to the supplier.
22.	For ICT projects, adopting new/unproven solutions for critical systems, or moving a critical system from a server-based solution to a hosted platform at the same time as undertaking a complex change / upgrade are considered to be excessive risks and should be avoided.

Project Governance and Decision Making

23.	All projects must define tolerances around time (project milestones), budget and resources at the outset, and these must be the central focus for RAG progress reporting. Any deviation (or risk of deviation) from baselined tolerances must be reported as project exceptions and options to either accept the deviation or to take another option must be recorded in the Project Board Decision Log.
24.	Change logs must be used to track all modifications to a project's scope, schedule, budget, or deliverables, documenting the "what, when, who, and why" for each alteration. The Change Log should indicate whether the project needs to be re-baselined. Every change should be analysed for any deviation this may or will cause to the agreed tolerances (see Recommendation 23).

Audit

25.	It is recommended that Internal Audit should undertake a further review 18 months after this report has been considered by the Executive. This would establish whether the accepted Task Group recommendations have been implemented, and whether they have been effective in addressing the identified concerns. A summary of the findings should be reported to the Governance Committee.

1. Introduction

This report has been prepared by the Project Management Task and Finish Group, which was set up to review the Council's approach to managing major projects and identify lessons to be learned from recent projects, including Care Director v6, and iTrent (Phase 1).

2. Purpose and Membership of the Task and Finish Group

2.1 The Scrutiny Commission originally agreed the terms of reference and membership for a Task and Finish Group at its meeting on 24 September 2024. Responsibility for the Task and Finish Group was subsequently passed to the Resources and Place Scrutiny Committee following restructuring of the Council's scrutiny function.

2.2 A copy of the Terms of Reference is provided in Appendix A. The scope of the review included the following aspects:

- Contract management
- Project management methodology
- Project management structure
- Resourcing
- Project governance
- Factors affecting project outcomes
- Lessons learned and changes to processes

2.3 In addition to considering how projects are managed across the Council, the Task and Finish Group undertook a deep dive on two projects – Care Director v6 and iTrent Phase 1.

2.4 The Task and Finish Group comprised the following Members:

- Councillor Chris Read (Chairman)
- Councillor Adrian Abbs
- Councillor Paul Dick
- Councillor Paul Kander
- Councillor Alan Macro
- Councillor Erik Pattenden

3. Meetings and Witnesses

3.1 The Task and Finish Group met five times between September 2025 and January 2026. Members heard evidence from a variety of West Berkshire Council (WBC) officers, including procurement professionals, solicitors, project managers, client teams, project sponsors, technical specialists, and auditors. Supplier representatives were invited to give evidence, but those who had been involved in the projects had either left the organisation or had moved to new roles in different part of the business, so were unavailable.

3.2 The Task and Finish Group also undertook primary research via an online survey of staff who had been involved in user acceptance testing of Care Director v6.

3.3 In addition, best practice exemplars of local authorities that had already improved their project management practices were sought out to understand what changes they had introduced, and to see if any of the lessons they had learned could be applicable to West Berkshire Council. Local authorities interviewed included Kent County Council and Winchester City Council.

Table 2: Meetings and witnesses interviewed

Date	Focus of Meeting	Witnesses
1 Sep 2025	**Project Management Practices:** • Project management methodology and scalability • Project management structure • Project management resources • Project management training • Project governance arrangements • Document management • Factors affecting project outcomes • Learning lessons, reviewing processes, and communicating change • Handover to business as usual • Pre-procurement feasibility / market testing / budget setting • Procurement methodology / negotiation • Contract management / procurement timetables • Off-boarding for expiring contracts • Legal challenges	Sarah Clarke (Executive Director – Resources) Gabrielle Mancini (Service Director - Transformation, Customer and ICT) Melanie Best (Transformation & Programme Manager) Kate Pearson (former Service Lead - Procurement and Commissioning)
20 Oct & 8 Dec 2025	**Care Director v6:** • Governance arrangements • Project Board agendas and minutes • Audit of Care Director v5 • Business case / continual business justification • Objectives • Budget • Timescales • Quality plans • Risk and impact assessment • Options appraisal • Delivery planning	Paul Coe (Executive Director, Adult Social Care) Melanie O'Rourke (Service Director, Adult Social Care) Jo England (Service Lead, Adult Social Care) Rich Pask (Former Adult Social Care Business Manager)

	• Consultation and engagement • Procurement process • Delivery partner • Project management • Management of resources • Assumptions and dependencies • Risk management • Issue management • Change control (including escalations / exceptions) • Stakeholder management and communications • Stage reviews • Testing (including results and remediation) • Project review • Lessons learned • Current status	Kate Toone (Programme Manager (Integration, Digital and Quality) Mat Scalpello (Applications Development Manager) Phil Cridge (Systems Integration Officer) Sarah Clarke (Executive Director, Resources) Dawn Bond (Legal Services Manager)
12 Jan 2026	**iTrent (Phase 1):** • Governance arrangements • Project Board agendas and minutes • Business case • Objectives • Budget • Timescales • Quality plan • Risk and impact assessment • Options appraisal • Delivery planning • Consultation and engagement • Procurement • Project management • Management of resources • Assumptions and dependencies • Risk management • Issue management • Change control (including escalations / exceptions) • Stakeholder management and communications • Stage reviews • Testing (including results and remediation) • Project review • Lessons learned • Current status	Sarah Clarke (Executive Director, Resources) Lorraine Collins (HR Systems and Data Manager) Julie Gillhespey (Audit Manager)
9 Feb 2026	**Review of Draft Report**	n/a

4. Findings

4.1 Key findings from each of the three parts of the review are outlined below.

Part 1 – Project Management

4.1.1 This part of the review looked at how projects are managed across the Council. Key findings are as follows.

Project Management Office

4.1.2 It was clear from the interviews with officers that many of the previous known weaknesses regarding the Council's approach to project management had already been or were in the process of being addressed.

4.1.3 Historically, project managers could either be within individual services or the Projects Service (PMO), with all projects tracked by the PMO. This had resulted in inconsistencies in abilities and approaches to project management across the organisation. However, this is changing such that all future projects will be delivered and tracked through the PMO (now Projects Service). This will help to achieve greater consistency of approach and will facilitate improved oversight and sharing of learning across the organisation.

Project Management Methodology, Skills and Training

4.1.4 A project calculator has been developed to determine the most appropriate project management methodology for any given project. There are four categories of project from 'business as usual' to 'large', with increasing levels of project governance, documentation, tools, and experience requirements for project managers / sponsors, which are considered to be commensurate with project value and complexity.

4.1.5 PRINCE2 is the default project management methodology for all WBC projects.

4.1.6 Project managers do not currently need to be certified in the relevant project management methodology, but the aim is to have a Projects Service (PS) where all project managers are sufficiently qualified and experienced to do their jobs.

4.1.7 A skills review is planned to ensure that there are appropriate levels of project management expertise within the Council. If planned projects would benefit from more advanced project management skills, then the Council would invest in training staff accordingly.

4.1.8 The Council has recently taken on a number of project managers who are well-qualified but lack experience. The ideal situation would be to have both, but it is challenging for the Council to retain experienced project managers who can often command larger salaries in the private sector.

4.1.9 For term contracts (e.g. Volker Highways), project management for day-to-day activity is provided as part of the contract. Larger, more complex schemes have a dedicated project manager. The option to use internal or external project management is considered in relation to the business case for each project.

Project Documentation

4.1.10 Previously, each service stored project documentation within their own areas on the server. However, the corporate programme is on Sharepoint, and all new projects are set up with their own Teams channel, which facilitates sharing.

4.1.11 A central data repository is being developed by the PS to capture learnings from projects in one place. However, further consideration is needed as to how to ensure project managers refer to this once it has been implemented.

Project Governance

4.1.12 All major projects have senior officer and Executive Portfolio Holder sponsors.

4.1.13 Corporate Programme Board (CPB) holds project managers and sponsors to account. This includes Executive Portfolio Holders as well as senior officers. Following a governance review, CPB replaced individual Programme Delivery Boards, which were inefficient, with senior officers having to attend multiple boards. The Corporate Programme is also a standing item at Senior Leadership Team (SLT) meetings.

4.1.14 There is evidence that some projects have clear escalation processes in place where agreed tolerances for projects are breached. (However, this is not currently a requirement of the Project Management Methodology, and it is not always the case.) SLT seeks to address issues as they arise, while Corporate Programme Board focuses on projects with a red / amber RAG rating.

4.1.15 The above governance arrangements were brought in by the current Chief Executive and were not in place when Care Director v6 and iTrent (Phase 1) were being delivered.

Procurement and Contract Management

4.1.16 Links with the Procurement & Commissioning Team have improved over time such that working practices are more in line with best practice. Officers are looking up to 3-4 years ahead to see what contracts are coming up for renewal. They are also seeking to understand which contracts are likely to be more complex, with lengthy procurement processes, and which may require experienced project managers and / or extensive involvement from technical specialists. Previously, officers had lacked capacity to do this on top of their day jobs.

4.1.17 Officers work backwards from the contract end date and estimated the time needed to complete each activity. The worst-case scenario is always adopted, and buffers are built in to allow for unforeseen issues. However, significant issues can still derail these timescales, and a service area's resources might be diverted to deal with business-critical matters, resulting in delays. For larger projects, the timetable is owned by the project team, but for smaller projects, it is seen as the Procurement & Commissioning Team's timetable.

4.1.18 In preparation for local government reorganisation, work was carried out with neighbouring authorities to map systems and procurement pipelines, in order to identify opportunities to reduce duplication and take advantage of economies of scale.

4.1.19 Prior to going out to tender for new projects, pre-market engagement exercises are run via the government's central digital platform. This helps to inform the service specification and identify the best procurement route (i.e., frameworks that included the main providers, or an open tender to allow new entrants with innovative products to bid).

4.1.20 The Procurement & Commissioning does a market engagement event whenever a framework is used. (This is a legal requirement.) They provide a high-level specification, suggested delivery timescales, and draft terms and conditions. This helps to highlight if there is anything that would prevent businesses registered on the framework from bidding.

4.1.21 The tender specification sets out essential and desirable outcomes, as defined by the service area. While open tenders have to include a range of anticipated spend, this is not a requirement for frameworks. The Council sometimes indicates how much it is currently spending to act as a guide, but in some cases, projects involve moving to a different model (e.g., Software as a Service (SaaS)), so costs are not comparable. In all cases, relative weightings of price and quality criteria give a clear indication to bidders as to the Council's focus. In some cases, weighting may include demonstration of functionality.

4.1.22 A recurring challenge is where providers seek to renegotiate once the contract has been awarded, particularly for ICT projects. Where frameworks have been used, the Council has approached the Crown Commercial Service (CCS) for support, where it has been felt that suppliers are not acting in line with their obligations, but this has not been successful. While CCS have often been sympathetic, they have not acted. It should be noted that anticipated changes to procurement legislation will allow for a competitive flexible procedure where some negotiation would be permitted in future.

4.1.23 When tendering projects, bidders are expected to contract on the basis of the terms of the published draft contract. If anything is deemed unworkable, then this can be raised through a clarification request. If accepted, then an amendment can be made to the terms, which would be open to all bidders, so no commercial advantage would be given.

4.1.24 Financial credit checks are carried out with new suppliers following award of contract to form a baseline against which future checks can be compared. Subsequent checks should be carried out by individual contract managers as part of due diligence, but this has not been routinely done. The recent NRS Healthcare bankruptcy[1] highlighted the importance of this activity, and Procurement & Commissioning are looking to introduce changes to working practices as a result.

4.1.25 Procurement & Commissioning has acknowledged that contract management is an area of weakness within the Council. New managers are often asked to manage contracts, with little or no training. This does not form part of managers' induction, and it is not part of their ongoing mandatory training. Also, there are no relevant online courses available on WBC's Learning Hub. However, this will be addressed as part of the new Procurement Strategy.

4.1.26 It was noted that the Legal and Procurement & Commissioning teams are sometimes asked to do things that should sit with services. Assumptions are often made about who will do certain tasks, which highlights the importance of using RACI matrices to ensure everyone knows which parties are Responsible, Accountable, Consulted and Informed in relation to individual elements of a project.

4.1.27 The issue of exit clauses in contracts was discussed. These can be invoked to require an outgoing provider to support the transition to a new provider. However, officers confirmed that it is not possible to simply attach a 'standard' exit provision, as the provisions of a contract will always vary according to the exact terms being used.

4.1.28 Local authorities routinely use frameworks to procure services. These frameworks are by their nature high level, so as to apply to a wide range of users and requirements. Therefore, areas such as implementation plans, business continuity and exit arrangements will be set out in schedules to the framework, with broad commitments to be supplemented by more detailed arrangements to be negotiated and agreed by the project and/or contract manager within the service. This may be something that could be covered as part of future project/contract management training for staff. Furthermore, standard expectations could be developed, and/or a list of points for consideration for use in procurement exercises and/or by project managers.

Project Resources

4.1.29 Officers cited implementation resource as being key to successful project delivery. In most cases, officers are required to deliver projects on top of their day jobs. The ICT Applications Team is very small, with individuals designated as subject matter experts.

4.1.30 Subject matter experts have to learn to use any new system that is delivered and to subsequently train colleagues. Also, it is often necessary to have

[1] Healthcare equipment maker goes into liquidation

parallel running of new and old systems. In many cases, subject matter experts are required to work on multiple projects at the same time, putting them under considerable stress. If these individuals were to fall sick, or leave the organisation, there would be a considerable impact on the service

4.1.31 West Berkshire Council is already a lean organisation, so there is limited scope to redeploy staff and backfill roles with people who have equivalent skills. External support has been bought in on some projects (e.g., BetterGov providing support for the Mosaic project). This can be very expensive, but it can deliver significant benefits for staff as well as the project.

4.1.32 Also, it is not clear if the Council is making the most of Artificial Intelligence. This could help to make officers more efficient when working on routine tasks and free up time to focus on projects.

4.1.33 The offline review of Project and Programme Management undertaken by Kent County Council concluded that WBC runs a similar good practice approach.

Part 2 – Care Director v6

4.2.1 This part of the review sought to identify lessons that could be learned from the failed implementation of the upgrade to Care Director, which is a social care case management and financial system.

Background

4.2.2 The Council currently uses Care Director Version v5 (CDv5). Originally developed by Care Works, it was subsequently bought out by Advanced. It utilises Microsoft Dynamics, which is an Enterprise Resource Planning solution that brings together customer, supply chain and finance elements into a single system, with advanced reporting tools, modular functionality, and industry-specific capabilities.

4.2.3 Microsoft eventually took the decision to withdraw support for the on-premises version of Dynamics, encouraging customers to move to its cloud-based Dynamics 365 platform instead. Mainstream support for the previous version ended in October 2021 with extended support ending in January 2023. This means that Microsoft no longer provides updates, hotfixes, or non-security support for the previous version.

4.2.4 However, in the original proposal (Tender Response Document – August 2015), the supplier (then Care Works who were later acquired by Advanced) stated *"The proposed software licence costs make provision for a technology refresh of the Microsoft Dynamics platform, so that it remains fit for purpose over the full 10 year contract lifetime."* It should be noted that according to Microsoft's official lifecycle policy for Dynamics 365 for Customer Engagement Apps, version 9.x (on-premises update), Extended Support ends on January

9, 2029.[2] Non-cloud based software systems (often termed "on-premises hosted"), such as Care Director v5 hosted at WBC, carry significant risks of end-of-life support.

4.2.5 Organisations that continue to use older versions of Dynamics are essentially running unsupported software, which comes with significant risks in terms of:

- Increased vulnerability to cyberattacks and consequent data breaches
- Increased maintenance costs (extended support costs are normally higher than normal support costs)
- Integration difficulties with newer applications and technologies (extended support typically includes no functional patching, just security patching)
- Limited access to specialist support, as fewer professionals have knowledge and experience of the older versions of Dynamics.

Commissioning

4.2.6 West Berkshire Council wrote to Care Works in December 2018 expressing concern about Microsoft Dynamics no longer being supported.

4.2.7 The supplier had come to WBC with a proposal to upgrade to Care Director v6 (CDv6), which used their own proprietary coding rather than relying on Dynamics. CDv6 was originally due to launch mid-2019 with all components by December 2019. CDv6 was new to market and unproven, and WBC was only offered demonstrations and sight of the functional specification.

4.2.8 Although it is thought that other local authorities may have been offered an upgrade to Dynamics 365, WBC was not. This could have been due to our combination of systems - interactions with other systems were complex (i.e. ContrOCC and Agresso). Also, West Berkshire used the platform in different ways to other local authorities, so a bespoke installation was required.

4.2.9 Senior officers appeared to be aware of the high level of risk associated with implementing a new / unproven product. However, this was not reflected in the minutes of the Executive meeting where it was agreed to implement CDv6.

4.2.10 Given that Advanced had come to WBC with a proposal, rather than WBC commissioning the work, it was dealt with as a contract variation. The decision to appoint Advanced went against the advice of senior officers in Adult Social Care who expressed concerns about the previous adversarial contractual relationship with the supplier and the challenges that had been experienced with implementing CDv5. Officers had advocated to go out to open tender instead.

[2] Key support dates for Microsoft Dynamics v9.1 (Service Pack 1) include:
- Mainstream Support End Date: January 12, 2027
- Extended Support End Date: January 9, 2029

4.2.11 Unfortunately, there are few alternative providers in the market, most of which have poor reputations amongst other local authority clients, although it is noted that a lack of resources and technical expertise is a common theme in the public sector, which can lead to delivery challenges regardless of the provider.

4.2.12 WBC is a small client, so there would be risks with switching providers. Additionally, there is always a risk of starting from scratch rather than transitioning to the next version of a familiar product, so there were pros and cons associated with either approach.

4.2.13 There was no purchase cost associated with CDv6, just consultancy support to implement it. Therefore, there would have been a big price differential compared to other options that required WBC to start from scratch.

4.2.14 At the same time as upgrading from CDv5 to CDv6, WBC had decided to move to a cloud-based system. This was part of a wider strategic shift to hosted environments. A key factor in the CDv6 decision had been that a hosted service would reduce the draw on ICT staff time. However, this brought additional resource requirement and implementation risk to an already high-risk project.

4.2.15 CDv6 introduced additional functionality – officers had fought hard to get the finance functionality included rather than being an additional cost item. However, the Statement of Works included a number of potential options, which introduced an element of ambiguity about what was to be delivered.

Project Management and Delivery

4.2.16 Despite a lack of resources being identified in the Lessons Learned Report for CDv5, this was not addressed for CDv6. CDv5 had taken 4 years to implement (with parallel running alongside the previous system).

4.2.17 Officers felt that the CDv6 project had been grossly under-resourced on both sides. Just one ICT resource had been allocated from WBC, who had been very stretched, due to being involved in delivering other projects and business as usual (BAU) activity. Similarly, the supplier only had one core technical resource allocated to the project, which officers considered insufficient.

4.2.18 Officers assigned to the project had quickly realised that the implementation would not be straightforward. The supplier's project plan focused on what they needed to do to implement the new system, and it did not include WBC's activity in any detail. Officers went through the supplier's project plan and mapped out WBC's activities and milestones. Although this was shared with the WBC project manager, it was not used for resource allocation. Concerns were raised by officers about the proposed timeline, based on experience with previous software upgrades, but these concerns were largely ignored. It was suggested that because WBC was one of the first local authorities to be upgraded to CDv6, Advanced did not properly appreciate the level of work

required. Also, there had been significant differences in how parallel running of finance systems was viewed by Council officers and by Advanced.

4.2.19 The subsequent WBC project manager took over from May 2021. She had previously worked on the project as a technical resource and consequently had a good technical understanding, so had got up to speed quickly and there had been no delay as a result of the change. It was clear from the documentary evidence and testimony of colleagues that the new project manager was effective and engaged in the project.

4.2.20 The supplier's project manager had also changed (at the request of WBC) part-way through the project, which had been disruptive, since the new person was not as technically adept as their predecessor.

4.2.21 A key challenge of the project was the first data migration, since the database includes a very large number of records. Unfortunately, the data migration tool provided by the vendor was not compatible with the version of CDv5 that WBC was using, so the migration failed, leading to delays. No other local authorities had used this tool previously. It was subsequently agreed to revert to a tried and tested system. Multiple failed data migrations meant that it took a long time to get to the point where testing was possible.

Project Governance and Decision Making

4.2.22 Prior to February 2022, reporting had been through normal project governance. However, as delays become significant, this was escalated. All subsequent date changes were reported through Resources Prioritisation Group, Corporate Projects Board, and Corporate Programme Board.

4.2.23 There were repeated problems and slippages in the programme, and there was a back and forth with the supplier about who was to blame. The WBC project sponsor started to hold monthly meetings with senior representatives from Advanced and WBC.

4.2.24 In April 2023, it was discovered that there was an issue with how CDv6 dealt with VAT, which would have cost a considerable sum of money to address. Other local authorities did not experience the same issue, probably because they were using different finance platforms.

4.2.25 At this point, the decision was taken to put the project on hold. A 'without prejudice' meeting was held with the supplier, seeking assurances that the problems could be resolved, but a way forward could not be agreed.

4.2.26 Members queried why there had been significant payments made to Advanced, despite the lack of progress. Officers explained that there had been dispute as to who was at fault, and it had been hard to pinpoint where the issues lay. Also, WBC had been liable for cloud costs regardless of progress. These costs were high due to the sheer volume of records. Members noted that the final payment was only 10%, which seemed insufficient to deal with snagging issues.

4.2.27 The Council sought external legal advice to see if they could recover costs from Advanced for failure to deliver the project. However, since fault lay on both sides, cost recovery was not considered an appropriate option.

4.2.28 By early 2024, both parties mutually agreed to stop work on the project.

4.2.29 There had been significant impacts on the Adult and Children's Social Care services as a result of the delays – a number of other initiatives could not be progressed, and the service was unable to meet statutory reporting requirements.

4.2.30 Members asked officers if concerns were listened to when escalated. There were regular meetings with senior representatives of Advanced, and they agreed to a change of project manager at the Council's request. Internally, officers felt that they were listened to, but there was pressure to complete. It was noted that a lot of work had been done on a critical system over an extended period of time, and it had appeared to be close to the finish line, so it was difficult to walk away.

Project Risk

4.2.31 The evidence presented to the Task Group highlighted a number of significant project risks.

4.2.32 Social care case management systems are critical to the operation of the Council, and loss of life is a potential risk associated with the system being unavailable.

4.2.33 There are few providers in the market, most of which have poor reputations amongst their local authority clients, so there would be risks with switching providers.

4.2.34 Officers had always enjoyed a good working relationship with the vendor's technical support team, with continuity of staff over a number of years, and support is still being provided for CDv5. However, implementation of CDv6 was carried out by a different team. Officers felt they were technically competent, and the problems stemmed from the fact that CDv6 was a new and unproven product.

4.2.35 Officers believe that there had only been one local authority where CDv6 had been successfully implemented before Advanced withdrew from the social care market. However, it was thought that West Berkshire Council was the only authority that had gone from CDv5 to CDv6 for both adults and children's social care.

4.2.36 WBC had not considered seeking independent support to upgrade to Microsoft Dynamics 365. However, Advanced had customised Dynamics and had control over the code.

Lessons Learned

4.2.37 The Lessons Learned Report for CDv6 contained 52 lessons – mostly around project delivery and resourcing, particularly in ICT.

4.2.38 Common reasons for projects failing are post-procurement additions to the contract and not tying the supplier to key deliverables in the contract.

4.2.39 The Task Group considered that the project scope should have been clearly defined and agreed by all parties at the outset. It was clear that officers' concerns about resources had been ignored and timescales were unrealistic, but the project had pressed ahead regardless.

4.2.40 Officers conceded that the statement of works and contract had left them exposed. Also, having a clear statement of project tolerances to guide decision making would potentially have resulted in termination of the contract at an earlier stage, thus avoiding further unnecessary work and associated expense.

4.2.41 It was clear that ICT and Social Care staff had serious concerns about the incumbent supplier from the outset and would have preferred to go to tender, but their views were not reported/taken into account when making the decision to upgrade to CDv6.

4.2.42 By April 2022, the negative impact of the project on key WBC staff was considered to be a 'red flag', and when the focus turned to the contract, that should have been seen as the sign of a failing relationship.

4.2.43 Members noted the concerns raised in the survey of staff who were involved in testing CDv6 and asked if it would be appropriate to include regular temperature checks with staff as part of project reporting. It was confirmed that this was being done for Mosaic (the successor to Care Director), and that the Project Manager was sensitive to the needs of staff. The challenge was how to respond, since there were few options to relieve pressure on key individuals, and again staff are working to deliver a project and continue with BAU activity.

4.2.44 Moving systems to the cloud would reduce business as usual maintenance and free up time to do value-adding activity. However, this would need significant resource to manage the transition, which was not currently available within the ICT Service.

4.2.45 Software As A Service (SAAS) works best as an off-the-shelf product for standard applications. Officers indicated that although Adult and Children's Social Care has standard legal and reporting frameworks, the Mosaic interfaces still have to be tweaked for WBC. This is where delays and additional costs are incurred.

4.2.46 Some lessons do appear to have been learned and are being applied on the Mosaic contract. Although Mosaic was not reviewed in any detail, the Task

Group learned that external resource has been brought in to project manage and support the delivery of Mosaic workstreams. This support comes at a substantial cost, but there are significant benefits in terms of delivery in terms of access to experienced professionals who are able to hold the provider to account and reduce the pressure on in-house staff. However, no additional internal ICT resource has been allocated to Mosaic, and the existing ICT resource is stretched to breaking point. This suggests that issues exposed by Care Director v6 (and its predecessors) are being repeated.

Part 3 – iTrent (Phase 1)

4.3.1 The final part of the review sought to identify lessons that could be learned from the procurement and implementation of iTrent (Phase 1), which is an HR and payroll system.

Background

4.3.2 iTrent was procured to replace three legacy systems (ResourceLink for HR and payroll, Jobs Go Public for recruitment, and Learning Pool for learning management) with a single, integrated system.

Commissioning

4.3.3 The ResourceLink contract end date coincided with the financial year end, which created additional pressures. This decision predated current management, but it was thought to be driven by financial considerations.

4.3.4 The Council was offered very unfavourable terms by ResourceLink to extend the contract beyond the existing term, so the decision was taken to go out to open tender. Unfortunately, the initial procurement exercise failed when the terms were rejected after the procurement exercise had concluded. The only lawful option available to the Council was to run the procurement again. Procurement Board agreed to use a framework to expedite the process. Due to the reduced timescale for delivery, bidders were asked to deliver a turnkey solution with minimal input from WBC staff. MHR was the successful bidder and was appointed to provide the iTrent platform.

4.3.5 Despite having the opportunity to raise points of clarification as part of the tender process, MHR sought to renegotiate terms once the contract had been awarded. Accepting this would have put the Council at risk of challenge from the other bidders. The matter had to be escalated to the MHR chief executive to achieve a resolution, which resulted in a five month delay.

Project Management and Delivery

4.3.6 Impacts from the compressed timeframe, included: additional pressure on resources and the need to bring in additional project management and ICT support. There was a significant risk of being unable to pay Council staff if the project was not delivered in time, so the decision was taken to split implementation of iTrent into phases with the initial focus on the critical Payroll

module and delivering a ‘minimal viable product’ (MVP) that only had essential functionality.

4.3.7 Despite bidders being asked to deliver a turnkey solution, significant local input was still required. Officers lacked knowledge of iTrent, so external consultants, Phase 3, were brought in to provide additional support. They had good knowledge of the old and new systems. This turned out to be critical to the success of the project.

4.3.8 Phase 3 had asked how the Council wanted iTrent to be configured, but officers did not know the system enough to specify this, since they had only seen a brief demonstration as part of the procurement process.

4.3.9 Internal workstream leads provided reassurance that the compressed delivery timescales were achievable – the project would not have proceeded otherwise. However, the project put considerable pressure on staff, resulting in a key officer going on long-term sick leave.

4.3.10 The project team had to work in a way that was less than ideal – they were unable to execute processes properly due to the compressed delivery timeframe, and officers had to write system blueprints before they had even received training.

4.3.11 ICT input was critical to the success of the project. However, project slippages meant that ICT staff were sometimes unavailable when needed. Officers indicated that misalignment of internal and external resources was a common reason for increased project costs on projects across the Council. Also, previous audits had highlighted that interdependencies were often not properly identified/mapped, and the impacts of slippages were not always fully appreciated/understood.

4.3.12 Despite having provided assurance that the project would be deliverable, just two days before data transfer was supposed to take place, ICT had indicated that it could not be completed in time. They had wanted to follow a textbook process, but Phase 3 found a pragmatic workaround. The project team acknowledged that Phase 3 had been critical to the successful delivery of the project.

4.3.13 It was highlighted that there was single point of failure in ICT due to reliance on one individual for middleware development. Officers acknowledged this as a recurring issue in Council projects and reflected the fact that small teams had to service a wide range of ICT systems.

<u>Project Governance and Decision Making</u>

4.3.14 Project governance arrangements included weekly project board meetings between the council and MHR, and regular updates to the Resources Prioritisation Board. Members also received regular updates during critical periods.

4.3.15 Officers highlighted concerns about the internal project management resource during the early stages of the project. No paperwork was provided for the initial Project Board meeting, and when asked for a copy of the risk register, the project manager had indicated that this was managed by MHR, and that there was no internal corporate risk register. This was established following escalation, and the Project Sponsor confirmed that risk management had proved to be critical to the success of the project.

4.3.16 Phase 3 was subsequently asked to undertake a project management health check, and the Internal Audit Manager was brought in to provide additional ongoing assurance.

4.3.17 It was noted that Corporate Programme Board had approved changes to completion dates at Stage Gate 1. This was necessary in order to hit the required delivery timescales.

4.3.18 Similarly, Members noted that there was qualified signoff for Stage Gate 3. This had been necessary in order to progress to parallel runs. User acceptance test results were below 100%, but the Internal Audit Manager, Phase 3 and MHR had all been comfortable with the pass rate. Despite the signoffs, all unresolved issues were captured and understood by both sides.

4.3.19 The project was highly pressured, but the Project Sponsor had been comfortable with the Stage Gate process, since she was receiving professional advice, and weekly updates were provided to Members.

4.3.20 Once the Project Board had been established, it was felt that the iTrent project had been managed effectively, particularly given the risks and issues that were identified. Apart from the initial meeting where paperwork had not been provided, the Project Sponsor felt she had access to the information necessary to make decisions. The Task Group commended the pragmatic decision making by the Project Sponsor.

4.3.21 The Task Group asked how the budget for the project was set. Officers confirmed that there was an existing budget for the three legacy systems. Officers had initiated discussions with neighbouring local authorities to understand what systems they were using and the associated costs. The budget had also been informed by the initial competitive tender process. It was confirmed that the budget had included internal costs. The project had remained within budget despite having brought in Phase 3 to provide additional support.

<u>Project Risk</u>

4.3.22 The greatest risk associated with this project was that 6,000 members of staff would not have been paid if iTrent had not been delivered in time.

4.3.23 Contingency plans had been put in place to mitigate this risk. The final payroll of 2023/24 was run through ResourceLink, with P60s printed and posted

rather than being issued electronically. Other back-up plans were developed based on different scenarios through to undertaking manual payment runs.

4.3.24 Initially, there had been concerns in relation to risk management. As mentioned previously, a corporate risk register had not been developed for the project, and risk management appeared to be delegated to the supplier. This reflected a similar finding of the Sports Hub Task and Finish Group.

4.3.25 A corporate risk register was established following escalation, and it was clear that risk management was critical to the project's success, particularly during the final stages.

4.3.26 Members challenged whether all current project managers were aware of the need to establish and maintain a corporate risk register. Officers indicated that project sponsors would ensure this happened. Also, centralisation of project management resource under the PS would improve the consistency of approach and the use of project documentation across the organisation. The team was relatively new, and this was still a work in progress.

4.3.27 It was acknowledged that there were challenges around communicating learning from projects, so any lessons were understood and acted upon across the organisation. The iTrent project was considered to be an exemplar in terms of effective risk management and it was felt that this should be a case study for project managers.

Lessons Learned

4.3.28 The failure of the initial procurement exercise and the challenges associated with MHR seeking to renegotiate terms after the tendering process had concluded resulted in compressed delivery timescales. However, these issues could not have been foreseen, and a reasonable timescale had been allowed for delivery when procurement had been initiated.

4.3.29 Delivery of iTrent had focused on achieving delivery of the MVP by the required deadline. There had been absolute clarity about the essential functionality that was needed from day one, with the remaining functionality postponed to future phases. This was the correct decision - as other local authorities and private sector organisations have found the consequences of failing to deliver employee relationship management (ERM) systems in time/incorrectly can be severe[3]. At present, officers don't routinely define project outcomes and how these will be measured. Undertaking a MoSCoW analysis[4] would help to set out requirements at baseline and could be used to define the MVP.

[3] Further delay in fixing council's troubled IT system - BBC News

[4] MoSCoW analysis is a prioritisation technique used to help understand and manage project priorities. The acronym stands for:

- M - Must have: Non-negotiable, critical requirements essential for project success and safety; the project fails without them.
- S - Should have: Important but not vital requirements; if left out, the project still functions, but value is reduced.

4.3.30 The Council does not routinely undertake cost benefit analysis to inform decisions as to whether projects should be delivered using internal or external resource. It defaults to the cheapest option on paper, which is usually to deliver in-house. However, slippage in timescales may result in internal staff being unavailable when need, leading to abortive costs. Detailed up-front planning, mapping and costing of resources would help to inform the decision about resourcing and delivery, as well as identifying where there are dependencies.

4.3.31 It was clear that Phase 3 were critical to the success of this project. They had knowledge of both the new and legacy systems, which was invaluable, as well as providing additional project management expertise and capacity. Delivery was achieved within budget.

4.3.32 A key lesson from the project is the need to provide additional support for staff working on major projects. Taking regular 'temperature checks' could help to identify where officers are experiencing unacceptable pressures and allow for mitigating action to be taken in a timely manner. If implemented on iTrent, this may have helped to avoid key staff going on long-term sick leave due to stress.

4.3.33 There is a need to identify and eliminate single points of failure, particularly within the ICT Service, since they are critical to the delivery of many projects. This is a particular concern for smaller unitary authorities, such as West Berkshire, that have to deliver the same breadth of services as a large county council, but with a much smaller team. Current financial challenges make it difficult to make the case for additional recruitment at this time, but there may be opportunities to address this following local government reorganisation.

4.3.34 There was evidence of changes to project scope and delivery timescales as the project progressed. The Council should consider the use of change logs to track all modifications to a project's scope, schedule, budget, or deliverables, documenting the "what, when, who, and why" for each alteration. This would help to maintain transparency, control scope creep, provide an audit trail, and ensure that stakeholders are kept informed of all changes.

4.3.35 It was suggested that gateways may not always be effective in providing challenge to project managers, due to the volume of projects that need to be considered. Tier 1 projects with red and amber RAG ratings are prioritised, but Corporate Programme Board is dependent on project managers providing accurate ratings and supporting information, having followed due process. The centralisation of project management resource is helping to improve standards and practices, but further assurance is needed that project management methodology is being correctly followed.

- C - Could have: Desirable, "nice-to-have" items that have low impact if omitted.
- W - Won't have (this time): Items recognized as out of scope for the current delivery cycle, often deferred to future, lower-priority releases.

5. Recommendations

5.1 The Task and Finish Group has developed a set of recommendations as set out below, informed by the testimony of the witnesses and the other evidence collected. The recommendations are not in any ranked order – all are considered important.

5.2 Members of the Task and Finish Group are encouraged by the improvements to project management practices that are being rolled out through the Projects Service. It is clear that there are pockets of excellence, with project managers and project sponsors who are delivering in accordance with agreed project management methodologies. However, it is disturbing to note that some of the issues uncovered by this review echo those highlighted by the previous review of the London Road Industrial Estate project. It is hoped that officers will take the opportunity to embed these learnings in their working practices, so the same mistakes are not repeated in future projects.

Procurement and Contracts and Supplier Relationship Management

Ref.	Recommendation
1.	For all major projects, suppliers must be asked to confirm what project management methodology they will be using.
2.	The Council must look 24 months ahead to identify where software support agreements for business critical systems are due to expire and procure replacements in good time to avoid unnecessary risk.
3.	Before commissioning major IT projects, there should be a full evaluation of all potential procurement options. This should be informed by the views of technical staff and other stakeholders who work with existing systems and suppliers. Any concerns raised should be captured in the risk log, which should be passed to the project team once procurement is complete.
4.	The Council should develop and maintain a live list of all IT systems and how they are integrated. This must be consulted when procuring all new IT systems to ensure the necessary system compatibility and functionality is specified and could be delivered by the new supplier. Any procurement of new IT systems should be signed off by the Council's ICT Service and the Project Sponsor.
5.	Wherever possible, the Council should seek to adopt standard business processes/working practices to avoid the need for IT product customisation, since bespoke changes can lead to unnecessary delays, project costs and risks.
6	Contracts for new IT systems must require suppliers to provide complete systems (including all necessary middleware and technical integration software) and associated product support for the life of the contract.
7.	Procurement timescales should factor in the potential for slippages, or failure to secure a new contract or, in extremis, the need to restart the procurement process.
8.	As part of due diligence, financial checks must be carried out on all contracts for business critical goods and services in order to be assured of the providers' financial viability. This needs to be done as part of the tender

	process, and at least annually thereafter as part of routine contract management. This should be done by an officer from Finance, Audit, or Procurement & Commissioning.
9.	Contract payments should be aligned clearly with project gateway review success. Large pre-payments before projects commencement should be avoided. Final payments should be set at an appropriate level to cover snagging issues and incentivise providers to complete in a timely manner.
10.	Contracts for critical services should include exit clauses to facilitate the handover of work and the onboarding of the new supplier at the end of the contract. The professional service rates should be clearly stated in the contract for exit services to be provided by the supplier. In many cases, the project/contract manager will be agreeing the detailed exit plan within a certain time period of contract signature, so it may be useful to develop guidance on this.
11.	In addition to all project managers, all Managers at Service Lead and above should have contract management training as part of their induction, with refresher training every three years thereafter. Service Leads should ensure there is a documented service review of all major contracts under their purview at intervals according to Recommendation 8 above.

Project Resources

12.	Cost benefit analysis should be undertaken over the lifetime of projects to inform decisions about delivery mechanisms. Similarly, there should be detailed up-front planning, mapping and costing of resources to inform the decision about whether to deliver projects using internal or external resources. A clear risk statement must be presented to the Project Board and Senior Leadership Team of resource commitment before approval of project commencement.
13.	Data ownership risk must be fully recorded in project and handed over to business on go-live. Full mitigation of the data loss risk must be adhered to at all times.
14.	All major projects must make use of **RACI** matrices to: • Identify who is **R**esponsible for delivery of each task. • Clarify who is **A**ccountable for decisions or delegations related to that task. • Specify who must be **C**onsulted before decisions are made about the task. • Identify who needs to be kept **I**nformed of progress.
15.	Staff, who need to manage major projects or be significantly engaged on these projects should not be asked to do this on top of business-as-usual activity. Instead, staff should have their substantive roles backfilled to allow them to focus on any major projects they are managing, or external project management support should be bought in. If this is not possible, then consideration should be given to what activities can be paused/scaled back for the duration of the project.
16.	Single points of failure should be avoided where an individual member of staff is the sole subject matter expert within the organisation.
17.	All projects must be properly scoped at the outset, with all West Berkshire Council actions and dependencies fully detailed. The scope must be signed

	off by all services that are key to delivery of a project, and resources must be allocated to tasks prior to project plans being signed off.
18.	Under the detailed project planning process, project dependencies must be identified, mapped, monitored and reported to the Project Board to highlight the implications of amending project timescales. Delays in the delivery of major projects must be taken into account when planning future staff workloads.

Project Deliverables

19.	For each project, there must be a clearly stated set of requirements that must be achieved in order for the project to be considered successful. Consideration should be given to use of the MoSCoW technique when defining these requirements. .
20	Large projects should be completed in phases, with business-critical aspects delivered first.

Risk Management

21.	All major projects must have risk registers that are kept updated and reported to the relevant project board on a regular basis. This must not be delegated to the supplier.
22.	For ICT projects, adopting new/unproven solutions for critical systems, or moving a critical system from a server-based solution to a hosted platform at the same time as undertaking a complex change / upgrade are considered to be excessive risks and should be avoided.

Project Governance and Decision Making

23.	All projects must define tolerances around time (project milestones), budget and resources at the outset, and these must be the central focus for RAG progress reporting. Any deviation (or risk of deviation) from baselined tolerances must be reported as project exceptions and options to either accept the deviation or to take another option must be recorded in the Project Board Decision Log.
24.	Change logs must be used to track all modifications to a project's scope, schedule, budget, or deliverables, documenting the "what, when, who, and why" for each alteration. The Change Log should indicate whether the project needs to be re-baselined. Every change should be analysed for any deviation this may or will cause to the agreed tolerances (see Recommendation 23).

Audit

25.	It is recommended that Internal Audit should undertake a further review 18 months after this report has been considered by the Executive. This would establish whether the accepted Task Group recommendations have been implemented, and whether they have been effective in addressing the identified concerns. A summary of the findings should be reported to the Governance Committee.

6. Thanks

The Task and Finish Group would like to thank all the officers who gave their time to provide the requested evidence and answer our questions.

Appendix A: Terms of Reference

Overview and Scrutiny Review Matrix

Review Topic: Project Management	**Timescale** **Start:** Apr 2025 **Finish:** tbc

Review Rationale:
The Scrutiny Commission has agreed to set up a Task and Finish Group to review the Council's approach to managing major projects and identify lessons to be learned from recent projects, including Care Director 6, and iTrent (Phase 1).

The scope of the review will include:

- Contract management
- Project management methodology
- Project management structure
- Resourcing
- Project governance
- Factors affecting project outcomes
- Lessons learned, changes to processes

Terms of Reference:
The Task and finish Group will consider the following:

- **Session 1 – How we manage projects in West Berkshire Council**
  - Project management methodology and scalability
  - Project management structure
  - Project management resources
  - Project management training
  - Project governance arrangements
  - Document management
  - Factors affecting project outcomes
  - Learning lessons, reviewing processes, and communicating change
  - Handover to business as usual
  - Pre-procurement feasibility / market testing / budget setting
  - Procurement methodology / negotiation
  - Contract management / procurement timetables
  - Off-boarding for expiring contracts
  - Legal challenges

- **Sessions 2 and 3 – Care Director 6**
  - Governance arrangements
  - Project Board agendas and minutes
  - Audit of Care Director 5
  - Business case / continual business justification
  - Objectives
  - Budget
  - Timescales
  - Quality plans
  - Risk and impact assessment
  - Options appraisal

- Delivery planning
- Consultation and engagement
- Procurement process
- Delivery partner
- Project management
- Management of resources
- Assumptions and dependencies
- Risk management
- Issue management
- Change control (including escalations / exceptions)
- Stakeholder management and communications
- Stage reviews
- Testing (including results and remediation)
- Project review
- Lessons learned
- Current status

- **Session 4 and 5 – iTrent (Phase 1)**
  - Governance arrangements
  - Project Board agendas and minutes
  - Business case
  - Objectives
  - Budget
  - Timescales
  - Quality plan
  - Risk and impact assessment
  - Options appraisal
  - Delivery planning
  - Consultation and engagement
  - Procurement
  - Project management
  - Management of resources
  - Assumptions and dependencies
  - Risk management
  - Issue management
  - Change control (including escalations / exceptions)
  - Stakeholder management and communications
  - Stage reviews
  - Testing (including results and remediation)
  - Project review
  - Lessons learned
  - Current status

- **Session 6 – Draft Report**

Review Membership:	**Chairman:** Councillor Chris Read
Councillor Adrian Abbs Councillor Paul Dick Councillor Paul Kander Councillor Alan Macro Councillor Erik Pattenden Councillor Chris Read	**Scrutiny Officer:** Gordon Oliver

Information Required:
Project management methodology
Structure chart
Training plans
Project management resources (including templates)
Issues arising
Lessons learned

Documents/Evidence:
Project mandates
Project proposals
Business cases
Statements of work
PIDs
Project plans / Gantt Charts
Risk and issues logs
Lessons learned reports
Examples of Project Board agendas, minutes, etc
Relevant audit reports

Witnesses:
Session 1:

- Sarah Clarke (Executive Director – Resources)
- Gabrielle Mancini (Service Director – Transformation, Customer and ICT)
- Melanie Best (Transformation and Programme Manager)
- Kate Pearson (Service Lead – Procurement and Commissioning)
- Dawn Bond (Legal Services Manager)

Sessions 2 and 3:

- Paul Coe (Executive Director – Adult Social Care)
- Jo England (Service Lead – Adult Social Care)
- Rich Pask (Business Manager – Adult Social Care)
- Kate Toone (Programme Manager – Integration, Digital and Quality)
- Sarah Clarke (Interim Executive Director - Resources)
- Andy Best (Acting Head of ICT)
- Mat Scalpello (Applications Development Manager)
- Rob Sweetman (Systems Team Leader)
- Phil Cridge (Systems Integration Officer)

Sessions 4 and 5:

- Sarah Clarke (Interim Executive Director – Resources)
- Paula Goodwin (Service Lead – Human Resources)
- Rich Strange (Project and Programme Manager)
- Kate Pearson (Service Lead – Procurement and Commissioning)
- Lorraine Collins (HR Systems and Data Manager)
- Julie Gillhespey (Audit Manager)

Measures Available

- Project spend vs budget
- Project delivery timescale vs original plan
- Resources allocated vs original plan

Desired Outcomes:
Members will identify lessons to be learned about how project management can be improved so these can be applied to future projects. The Task and Finish Group will make recommendations in a report to the Scrutiny Commission. If approved, the recommendations will then go to Executive for consideration.